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Abstract 
Researcher: Rahim Daud Agha 
Title: EVALUATING SCENARIOS THAT CAN STARTLE AND SURPRISE 
    PILOTS 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Science in Aeronautics 
Year: 2020 
Startle and surprise on the flight deck is a contributing factor in multiple aviation 
accidents that have been recognized by multiple aviation safety boards.  This study 
identified the effects startle and surprise had on commercial pilots with single and multi-
engine ratings.  Surprise is defined here as something unexpected (e.g., engine failure), 
while startle is the associated exaggerated effect of an unexpected condition (e.g., thunder 
sound).  Forty pilots were tested in a basic aviation training device configured to a Cessna 
172 (single-engine) and a Baron 58 (multi-engine).  Each pilot flew the single- and multi-
engine aircraft in a scenario that induced an uninformed surprise emergency condition, 
uninformed surprise and startle emergency condition, and an informed emergency 
condition.  During each condition, heart and respiration rate, flight performance, and 
subjective workload measures were collected.  The startle and surprise condition showed 
the highest heart and respiration rates for both aircraft.  However, there was no difference 
in either the heart or respiration rates between the two aircraft for the informed condition.  
The subjective measures of mental, physical, and temporal demands, effort, and 
frustration were higher for the twin-engine aircraft when compared to the single-engine 
aircraft for all conditions.  Performance (subjective) was not different between the single- 
vi 
and multi-engine aircraft for the surprise condition only.  Objective flight performance, 
which was evaluated as a) participants’ adherence to the engine failure checklist steps for 
single-engine aircraft; and b) altitude deviation for multi-engine aircraft, showed that 
pilots performed better in the informed emergency condition.  Startle and surprise can be 
measured using heart and respiration rate as physiological markers, which can be used to 
evaluate if different flight simulator scenarios are startling, surprising, or neither.  
Potential applications of this study will help develop flight simulator scenarios for 
various unexpected conditions of different aircraft.  Results of this study can potentially 
help pave the way for federal regulations that require training for startle and surprise.    
Keywords:  unexpected events, workload, vital signs, commercial pilots, training
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
The behavior of pilots in most Loss of Control-In Fight (LOC-1) accidents is 
unexplained (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2017; National Transportation 
Safety Board [NTSB], 2010).  In recent years after the crash of Air France 447 (AF447) 
and Colgan Air (CA3407), investigators have concluded that surprise and startle can 
disrupt the ability of most pilots to respond to an unexpected event.  It is recommended to 
develop simulator scenarios that can surprise and startle pilots, and such scenarios to be 
used for training (FAA, 2017). 
The terms startle and surprise are often used interchangeably in aviation 
operational practice (Rivera, Talone, Boesser, Jentsch, & Yeh, 2014).  However, several 
authors have pointed out that startle and surprise are inherently different responses 
resulting from a different cause and effect (Martin, Murrary, Bates, & Lee, 2015; Rivera 
et al., 2014).  The NTSB (2010) report on Colgan CA3407 and Bureau d'Enquêtes et 
d'Analyses (BEA; 2012) report on Air France (AF447) crash used “surprise” and “startle” 
as different terminologies.   
Surprise is a cognitive-emotional response to an unexpected event that contradicts 
one’s expectation, thus, forcing the person to change his or her understanding of the 
situation (Foster & Keane, 2015; Horstmann, 2006; Schützwohl, 1998; Niepel, Rudolph, 
& Schützwohl, 1998).  Startle is a brief and highly physiological reaction to a sudden or 
threating stimulus, such as the sound of a gunshot (Martin et al., 2015; Thackray, 1988).  
According to Landman, Groen, van Paassen, Bronkhorst, and Mulder (2017a), eye blinks, 
contraction of the neck and facial muscles, the arrest of ongoing behavior, and report of 
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anger or fear are measurable aspects of startle.  
The cause and effect of surprise and startle also differ.  For instance, a person can 
be surprised and startled at the same time, but the same person can also be surprised in 
the absence of a startle.  Alternately, lightning strikes when flying through bad weather 
can be startling but not surprising.  Even though studies indicate that surprises are 
common in the aviation industry, most of these events are not significant (de Boer & 
Hurts, 2017; Kochan, Breiter, & Jentsch, 2004).  However, Landman et al. (2017a) 
suggested that surprise may impair the pilot’s problem-solving abilities in some cases. 
The crashes of AF447, CA3407, and Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 (TA1951) in 
2009 were the main reason for the introduction of the term startle in aviation.  In the 
aftermath of the CA3407 accident, the NTSB (2010) mentioned startle as one of the 
contributing causes of the accident.  According to the NTSB (2010), the pilot was startled 
by the activation of the stick shaker, which led to confusion in the cockpit.  Surprise has 
been a factor in airline accidents for more than three decades, having been mentioned in 
multiple accident reports.  However, startle is a new concept in aviation, which was the 
center of debate after multiple crashes in 2009 (BEA, 2012; NTSB, 2010). 
In a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), the FAA (2014) proposed 
changes in the evaluation of certain training maneuvers in the Flight Simulation Training 
Devices (FTSD).  It was presumed that training in realistic scenarios would help diminish 
the startle effect.  Congruently, the FAA (2013) postulated that the goal of startle training 
is to provide pilots with startle experience, which, in turn, would allow for the effective 
recovery of the aircraft during emergencies.  They ascertained that the physiological 
response of startle is difficult to re-create in a simulated training environment, while 
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surprise can easily be created.  They further suggested that surprise may lead up to startle 
if certain parameters are introduced at the right time.  The FAA (2017) acknowledges that 
startle and surprise have been key factors in multiple Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) 
accidents. 
Statement of the Problem 
According to Casner, Geven & Williams (2013), airline training events are highly 
scripted and predictable, which calls into question the abilities of pilots to recognize and 
respond to abnormal events.  Similarly, BEA (2012) found that airline crews receive little 
training on how to manage a sudden and stressful event that requires quick and precise 
decision-making, while Casner et al. (2013) found that pilots are required by regulations 
to practice each abnormal event in training before the actual flight.  Hence the pilots can 
anticipate that an unusual event will occur during the training.  
Congruently, Moriarty (2015) found that pilots are accustomed to the idea that 
they will rarely face an emergency in their carrier, so to quickly transition from this 
presumed level of safety to a confusing (difficult) and life-threatening flight condition 
can startle and surprise pilots.  While they are trained for emergencies, there are ample 
combinations of circumstances that pilots cannot train during simulator practice.  
According to Landman et al. (2017a), unexpected events induce a startling effect that 
may significantly impair performance.  Situations that require human intervention usually 
are unanticipated, demanding quick and correct decision making.   
Presently, no study has recorded the heart rate (HR) and respiration rate (RR) of 
pilots during events that can be surprising and startling.  In addition, few studies have 
evaluated pilot performance during a startling event (Gillen, 2016; Martin et al., 2015), 
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while few studies evaluated performance during events that were surprising (Kochan et 
al., 2004; Rankin, Woltjer & Field, 2016).  However, in all these studies, there was no 
evidence to substantiate that the scenario was startling or surprising for the participants.  
Similarly, the workload during startle and surprise events in most cases will increase, but 
no study has evaluated workload during the aforementioned situations.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to assess the differences in the physiological 
response and performance between startle and surprise conditions.  Heart rate and 
respiration rate were recorded to validate if the scenario was able to startle and surprise 
pilots.  The study compared the scenarios for two aircraft (single-engine and multi-
engine).  The researcher also evaluated pilots’ self-assessment of workload during startle 
and surprise events using the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load 
Index (NASA-TLX). 
Significance of the Study 
The review and analysis of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) safety 
database revealed that the term “startle” was mentioned in 134 coded reports, while the 
term “surprise” was mentioned in 904 coded reports (Rivera et al., 2014).  The European 
Air Safety Agency (EASA) in Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPM) (2014) addressed 
the need for surprise and startle training.  The training should address unexpected and 
stressful situations and prepare the crew to master these sudden events.  However, for the 
training to be successful, there is a need to propose scenarios that can startle and surprise 
pilots.  Presently, few studies have investigated if an unexpected event can startle and/or 
surprise pilots by recording vital signs (e.g., respiration rate) and skin conductance 
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(Landman et al., 2017a).  This study is filling the research gaps by evaluating the effect  
of startle and surprise on pilot workload and vital signs (heart rate and respiration rate). 
Surprise and startle training can help improve a pilot’s performance during an 
emergency (EASA 2014; FAA, 2015).  However, pilots cannot be trained for every 
possible emergency.  For the training to be successful, flight training scenarios must be 
proposed that can startle and surprise the pilots.  Most studies conducted on the topic only 
looked at a single type of aircraft.  However, the researcher believes that for commercial 
pilots, type of aircraft can be a potential factor that can affect vital signs and 
performance.  
Research Question and Hypothesis 
The researcher for the current study investigated the following research questions.  
The study has 10 dependent variables and two independent variables (IV): aircraft with 
two levels, single-engine (Cessna 172SP) and multi-engine (Baron 58); and emergency 
scenario with three levels, uninformed surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and 
startle emergency, and informed emergency. 
1. Do significant differences and interactions exist for heart rate (DV) and 
respiration rate (DV) based on the aircraft (IV) and emergency scenario (IV)? 
2. Do significant differences and interactions exist for mental demand (DV),  
physical demand (DV), temporal demand (DV), subjective performance (DV), 
effort (DV), and frustration (DV) based on the aircraft (IV) and emergency 
scenario (IV)? 
3. Do significant differences exist in the flight performance (DV) between the 
emergency scenarios (IV) for the multi-engine aircraft as measured by altitude  
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deviation?  
4. Do significant differences exist in the flight performance (DV) between the 
emergency scenarios (IV) for the single-engine aircraft as measured by the 
number of engine-failure checklist steps followed? 
The following null hypotheses were tested. 
H01: There was no significant difference in heart rate between flying a single-engine and 
flying a multi-engine aircraft.  
H02: There were no significant differences in heart rate among an uninformed surprise 
emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency 
H03: There were no significant interactions in the heart rate between the aircraft and the 
emergency scenario. 
H04: There was no significant difference in the respiration rate between flying a single-
engine and flying a multi-engine aircraft.  
H05: There were no significant differences in respiration rate among an uninformed 
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed 
emergency. 
H06: There were no significant interactions in the respiration rate between the aircraft and 
the emergency scenario. 
H07: There was no significant difference in the mental demand between flying a single-
engine and multi-engine aircraft.  
H08: There were no significant differences in mental demand among an uninformed 
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed 
emergency. 
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H09: There were no significant interactions in mental demand between the aircraft and 
the emergency scenario. 
H010: There was no significant difference in physical demand between flying a single-
engine and multi-engine aircraft. 
H011: There were no significant differences in physical demand between an uninformed 
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed 
emergency. 
H012: There were no significant interactions in physical demand between the aircraft and 
the emergency scenario. 
H013: There was no significant difference in temporal demand between flying a single-
engine and multi-engine aircraft. 
H014: There were no significant differences in temporal demand between an uninformed 
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency 
H015: There were no significant interactions in temporal demand between the aircraft and 
the emergency scenario. 
H016: There was no significant difference in subjective performance between flying a 
single-engine and multi-engine aircraft. 
H017: There were no significant differences in subjective performance between an 
uninformed surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and 
informed emergency 
H018: There were no significant interactions in subjective performance between the 
aircraft and the emergency scenario. 
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H019: There was no significant difference in effort between flying a single-engine and 
multi-engine aircraft. 
H020: There were no significant differences in effort between an uninformed surprise 
emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency. 
H021: There were no significant interactions in effort between the aircraft and the 
emergency scenario. 
H022: There was no significant difference in frustration between flying a single-engine 
and multi-engine aircraft. 
H023: There were no significant differences in frustration between an uninformed 
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed 
emergency. 
H024: There were no significant interactions in frustration between the aircraft and the 
emergency scenario. 
H025: There were no significant differences in flight performance among the emergency 
scenarios for the multi-engine aircraft as measured by altitude deviation. 
H026: There were no significant differences in flight performance among the emergency 
scenarios for the single-engine aircraft as measured by the number of engine-failure 
checklist steps followed. 
Delimitations 
The results of this study should be considered in the context of the following 
delimitations: 
1. The study only evaluated two scenarios that have the potential to induce 
surprise and two scenarios that have the potential to induce startle and 
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surprise. 
2. The study only observed commercial pilots with single-engine and multi-
engine rating. 
3. The study observed pilots on the X-Plane 11 Basic Aviation Training Device 
(BATD) while flying a Cessna 172 six-pack (C172SP) and Beechcraft Baron 
58. 
4. The study cannot represent the whole pilot population in the aviation industry. 
Limitations and Assumptions 
The researcher sought to mitigate potential limitations that can change the results. 
For this study, the following limitations were considered: 
1. The BATD, though realistic in nature, involves simulation limits such as lack 
of motion and gravitational forces. 
2. The participants were not randomly selected for this study. 
3. The participant’s behavior was observed under controlled conditions, which 
may not be the same in a natural environment. 
The following assumptions were considered for this study: 
1. The study assumed that each participant was physically fit and capable of 
flying a scenario in a BATD. 
2. The participants have never received any training related to startle and 
surprise. 
3. The study also assumed construct validity in that the surprise and startle 
emergency properly reflected (or induced) startle (and same for the surprise). 
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Definitions of Terms 
Aircraft A device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air 
  (FAA and Aviation Supplies and Academics [ASA], 2015). 
Startle  An uncontrollable, automatic muscle reflex, raised heart rate, and 
blood pressure elicited by exposure to a sudden, intense event that 
violates a pilot’s expectations (FAA, 2015). 
Surprise An unexpected event that violates a pilot’s expectations and can 
affect the mental processes used to respond to the event (FAA, 
2015). 
List of Acronyms 
AC Advisory Circular 
AF447 Air France 447 
AS Automation Surprise 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
BATD Basic Aviation Training Device 
BEA  Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety 
CA3407 Colgan Air 3407 
CAST  Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
CRM  Crew Resource Management 
DAB  Daytona Beach International Airport 
DOT  Department of Transportation 
DSB  Dutch Safety Board 
ERAU  Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
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EASA  European Air Safety Agency 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
HR Heart Rate 
HAI Human Automation Interaction  
IATA International Air Transport Association 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
LOC-I Loss of Control In-Flight 
NASA-TLX National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index 
NPA Notice of Proposed Amendment 
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rule Making 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
PF Pilot Flying 
PNT Pilot Not Flying 
PARC Performance-Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
RR Respiration Rate 
SBT Scenario-Based Training 
SDT Signal Detection Theory  
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
TA1951 Turkish Airlines 1951 
UPRT Upset Prevention and Recovery Training 
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Chapter II 
Review of the Relevant Literature 
A literature review was conducted to identify relevant peer-reviewed articles and 
studies.  The articles reviewed were related to the supervisory role of humans in 
automation, signal detection theory (SDT), automation bias and complacency, startle 
effect, surprise, and LOC-I incidents.  Further, this study also analyzed the investigation 
reports of NTSB, BEA, and the Dutch Safety Board (DSB). Similarly, the Advisory 
Circulars (ACs), NPRM, Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA), and guidance material 
related to surprise, and startle was also studied.  The review begins by discussing the role 
of humans in supervising automation.  The literature review then discusses the SDT and 
relates it to automation bias and complacency.  Further, startle and surprise are discussed 
in detail.  Lastly, the review relates all the theory to actual airplane accidents in recent 
years and discusses pilot training.  The purpose of this literature review is to give the 
readers a broad overview of the issue at hand and identify potential gaps in the literature 
that needs investigation. 
Human Supervisory Role in Automation 
 Casner et al. (2014) suggested that flight automation systems have now assumed 
the primary responsibility for many piloting tasks.  Pilots are no longer required to carry 
out the control inputs manually.  This paradigm shift is seeing the pilot's role being 
limited to automation monitoring or supervisory (Bhana, 2010).  Supervision is defined 
as the activity of occasionally programming and receiving information from a computer, 
while the performer of the supervision is called a supervisor (Hew, 2016). 
 Boubin, Rusnock, and Bindewald (2017) ascertained that most automated systems  
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cannot replace humans despite having superior performance.  Evidently, human operators 
can provide value because they can make judgments in situations where automation fails.  
To accomplish most tasks safely, human and automation must become a team in which 
the human maintains a supervisory role, while the automation makes the majority of the 
decisions.  However, Bhana (2010) found that instead of teaming up with automation, 
pilots normally over-rely on automation during unexpected events.  This overreliance 
during supervisory duties can lead to improper evaluation of the signals and responses 
obtained during an automated process, hence decreasing the performance. 
Signal Detection Theory 
The processing of information in automated systems begins with the detection of 
an environmental event (Wickens, Hollands, Banbury, & Parasuraman, 2013).  However, 
some stimuli are not identified, or they do not produce the anticipated response (Ponce, 
Polasko & Molina, 2016).  As a result, the process does not accomplish the desired 
results.  Hence, SDT is a tool that allows us to evaluate the signals and responses 
obtained during a process for increasing the performance of the complete process.  
According to Wickens et al. (2013), SDT can be applied to the analysis of the 
detection performance by a human alone, by a machine, or by both humans and 
machines. The signal detection theory results in two responses: yes (signal is present) or 
no (signal not present).  For example, there can only be two responses while assessing if 
the driving situation is hazardous (Wallis & Horswill, 2007).  In this driving situation, 
there are two states of the world, and the observer is responsible for deciding which state 
has occurred (Wickens et al., 2013).  
  The combination of the states of the world (i.e., whether a stimulus such as a 
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threat is either present or not present) and the operator’s response to the stimulus (i.e., 
whether to treat the stimulus as a threat or not) produces the 2 x 2 matrix shown in Figure 
1, generating four classes of joint events (Wickens et al., 2013).  The joint events are 
labeled as misses, hits, false alarms, and correct rejections (Wallis & Horswill, 2007).   
  
 
   
Figure 1. The four outcomes of SDT. 
 
 
 
 The Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and the Performance-Based 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (PARC; 2013), suggested that pilots are reluctant to 
intervene during emergencies, as they rely too much on automated systems.  The SDT 
can be applied to pilots, where the identification of the emergency is very important.  For 
example, in the case of AF447, the aircraft was cruising when the pitot tube was chocked 
due to the formation of ice crystals (BEA, 2012).  This led to false speed reading, which 
resulted in a stall warning (false alarm), the pilot flying (PF) did not recognize the false 
alarm.  Eventually, severe turbulence, along with stall warning startled the PF who started 
pushing the aircraft nose up, further destabilizing the aircraft.  However, the pilot not 
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flying (PNF) recognized the false alarm but was not aware that the PF did not recognize 
the false alarm.  The only thing the PF was supposed to do during this situation was just 
to fly the aircraft level for a while so that the ice crystals clear away, something he was 
trained for; however, his behavior was not consistent with training (BEA, 2012).  In the 
case of CA3407, the automated system did pitch the aircraft nose down automatically 
when the stall was imminent (automation hit), but the PF pulled back on the control, 
causing the aircraft to stall and crash (NTSB, 2010). 
Automation Compliance and Reliance 
 
In the past two decades, the diverse effects of automation false alarms and misses 
on operator trust and performance have been scrupulously examined (e.g., Wickens et al., 
2015; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  Wickens, Clegg, Vieane, and Sebok (2015) 
suggested that imperfect automation in an alerting system can result in two types of 
automation errors.  If the alerting system misses an actual dangerous event, then it can be 
an error of omission.  Alternately, if the system issues a false alert, then it can be an error 
of commission.  Each error will trigger a different Human Automation Interaction (HAI) 
behavior when the operator’s anticipation of automation failure is low.  The 'overreliance' 
of an operator is associated with an error of omission, while the 'over-compliance' is 
associated with an error of commission. 
According to Dixon, Wickens, and McCarley (2007), automation miss (not aware 
of changes made by automation) is more dangerous than an automation false alarm, as it 
may lead to true future alerts being disregarded.  Automation miss is troublesome if the 
operator relies on the automation to identify all events (Wickens et al., 2015).  
Alternately, Dixon and Wickens (2006) suggested that an increase in automation miss 
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rate reduces reliance, thus, causing the operator to monitor the raw data behind the 
automation miss, which diverts the attention of the operator from other concurrent tasks, 
causing a deterioration in performance.  Congruently, Geels-Blair, Rice, and Schward 
(2013) found that automation misses tend to cause a reduction in reliance. Conversely, 
automation false alarms tend to cause a reduction in compliance. 
According to Wickens et al. (2015), overreliance and over-compliance are closely 
associated with HAI problems of complacency and automation bias.  Complacency is 
linked to the failure to be attentive in supervising automation before an automation miss. 
Similarly, Bhana (2010) suggested that in aviation, automation complacency is a term 
interchangeable with automation overconfidence and is described as pilots becoming 
complacent because they are overconfident and uncritical of automation.  Parasuraman 
and Riley (1997) ascertained that automation complacency occurs when the operator 
excessively trusts the automation and fails to perform his supervisory duty.  Lee (2008) 
suggests that automation seems to relieve people of tasks, but automation requires more 
attention to training and integration design.  The BEA (2012) in the official report on 
AF447 accident, discovered that the autopilot disconnection made the crew aware that 
there was an issue. The crew was not sure why the autopilot disconnected.  The autopilot 
disconnection led to a false instrument reading, which surprised both pilots and startled 
the co-pilot.  The surprise and startle event started because the pilots were over-relying 
on automation during an emergency to assist with the task.  Congruently, Parasuraman 
and Riley (1997) found that complacency has been a contributing factor in accidents in 
domains other than aviation.  A widely cited example is the grounding of the cruise ship 
Royal Majesty, where it was found that the overreliance of the watch officers on 
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automation systems was a probable cause of the accident.  Alternately, Wickens et al. 
(2015) suggested that automation bias is the tendency to use automated cues as a 
replacement for information seeking.  Eventually, this results in an error as the operator 
fails to notice a problem simply because the automation fails to detect them. 
Similarly, Sauser, Chavaillaz, and Wastell (2016) found that automation bias is a 
tendency to follow the advice of the automation without deeming it correct or wrong. 
Parasuraman and Manzey (2010) ascertained that even with extended training and 
practice, the elimination of complacency and automation bias is difficult to achieve.  
Complacency and automation bias are closely linked with the pilots being startled and 
surprised during unexpected events (BEA, 2012; DSB, 2010). 
Startle 
 Startle is a response to an unexpected stimulus that is common in all mammals 
(Simons, 1996).  According to Koch (1999) and Martin et al. (2012), startle is an event 
that triggers (a) a spontaneous physiological reflex, and (b) a behavioral startle response. 
The spontaneous startle reflex is fast, and it involves eye blinks, contraction of muscles, 
head ducks, and shoulder squat up.  All these actions are to prepare the body for 
protection against unexpected situations.  Similarly, the startle response includes 
spontaneous muscle contractions like a startle reflex, but also other emotional and 
cognitive resources.  The startle reflex can trigger through auditory, visual, or tactile 
stimuli. It begins within 100 milliseconds (ms) of a stimulus being sensed (Carlsen, Chua, 
Inglis, Sanderson, & Franks, 2008; Yeomans, Li, Scott, & Frankland, 2002).  Startle 
reflex lasts less than one second for a mild response and in the range of 1 s to 1.5 s for a 
severe response (Rivera et al., 2014; Ekman, Friesen, & Simons, 1985).  Fetcho and 
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Mclean (2010) suggested that one way to elicit a startle is by presenting a sudden and 
loud sound.  For example, a sound level of 80-90 decibels (dB) and more can startle a 
person (Fetcho & Mclean, 2018). 
 Fear-potentiated startle.  According to Davis (1992) and Martin et al. (2015), 
the effects of startle increase when it occurs in the presence of a threating stimulus.  Such 
aggregative responses which are worse in magnitude and have a longer-lasting effect are 
described as fear-potentiated startle.  Similarly, Martin, Murrary, Bates, and Lee (2016) 
found that the fear-potentiated startle ensues from the combination of startling stimulus 
and the perception of threat, causing a fully developed stress reaction.  According to 
Gillen (2016) and Rivera et al. (2014), unexpected events on the flight deck, such as 
aerodynamic stalls trigger fear-potentiated startle.  Research has shown that fear-
potentiated startle results in a significant cognitive disruption in most people (Gillen, 
2016; Thackray &Touchstone, 1970). 
 Cognitive consequences due to startle.  Gillen (2016) found that the cognitive 
resources of humans are finite.  The author suggested that pilots need to devote more 
cognitive resources when flying manually, due to system failures or other issues.  Further, 
the study found that during such system failures, most pilots tend to lose the ability to 
mentally project where the airplane is in space in regard to altitude, airspeed, and 
configuration. 
Thackray and Touchstone (1970) determined that the recovery of performance 
after a startling event is quick.  After the introduction of a startling stimulus, the 
maximum disruption occurs for the first 5 s.  While significantly less disruption after the 
second 5 s interval lasts for 30 s to 1 minute.  So, it is evident that the major performance 
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decline occurs within the first 5 s following a startle.  Similarly, Martin et al. (2012) 
found that startle reaction may last between 0.3 s to 1.5 s, depending on the severity.  
Thackray and Touchstone (1983) found that the participants who were exposed to a 
sudden high potency aural alarm signal made more incorrect responses on a task.  On the 
other hand, participants who received a low-intensity alarm signal made less incorrect 
responses.  Startle disrupts cognitive processing and negatively influences an individual's 
decision making and problem-solving abilities. 
 Gillen (2016), discussing the multiple resource theory, suggested that task 
performance depends on the relation between two parameters: cognitive resources 
available and the complexity of the situation.  Ippel (1987; as cited in Gillen, 2016) 
suggested that task performance can be satisfactory if the amount of resources consumed 
by the task is lower than or equal to the available amount of memory.  Alternatively, task 
performance can decline if the amount of resources consumed is greater than the 
available memory.  Similarly, Martin et al. (2012) found that the performance of pilots 
during a startling event declined when the cognitive loads exceeded the number of 
available resources. 
 Startle from the aviation perspective.  Gillen (2016) found that startle has been 
well researched and documented over the past 60 years.  The concept of startle was 
introduced in the aviation industry after the accidents of CA3407, AF447, and TA1951.  
Since these accidents, few studies have been conducted related to startle among pilots 
(Gillen, 2016; Landman et al., 2017a; Landman, Groen, van Paassen, Bronkhorst, & 
Mulder, 2017b;  Martin, Murray, & Bates, 2012; Martin et al., 2015; Martin et al., 2016; 
Rivera et al., 2014).  According to IATA (2015a), startle is defined as the initial short-
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lived, spontaneous physiological and cognitive reactions to an unexpected event that 
initiate the normal human stress response.  Similarly, as stated earlier, according to FAA 
(2015), startle is defined as an uncontrollable muscle reflex, and high blood pressure due 
to sudden exposure to an intense event. 
Martin et al. (2015) suggested that airline pilots are regularly vulnerable to 
startling stimuli.  However, most of these stimuli are irrelevant, but some pilots are 
exposed to critical events.  For example, in the case of AF447, the aircraft was flying 
through severe turbulence and had a blocked pitot tube, which was startling for the PF, 
though this type of situation is common when flying over the Atlantic and some pilots 
will not find it startling or surprising.  Similarly, Rivera et al. (2014) suggested that pilots 
can experience a variety of stimuli on the flight deck that can trigger a startle reflex and 
response.  However, the main concern during or after a startle is the appropriateness of 
the pilot’s decision choice and execution.  The BEA (2012) in the accident report of 
AF447 found that the PF was so much startled that he verbally agreed to the PNF pitch 
down instruction, while still actually pitching up.  Hence the need for an appropriate 
decision about complex flight tasks during startle is of utmost importance.  
The BEA (2012), in the investigative report of AF447, found that the poor 
management of the startle effect was one of the causes of the accident.  Further, it was 
found that the startle effect played a significant role in the destabilization of the flight 
path.  Interestingly it was found that the crew had performed training like the actual 
operating scenario, but the training did not consider the ramification of startle on their 
behavior.  Similarly, the NTSB (2012), in the accident report of CA3407, found that the 
captain’s behavior was consistent with startle and confusion.  The PF, in the case of 
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CA3407, reacted similarly to the PF in the case of AF447, where he pulled back on the 
control after stall when he should have pulled down.   
Gillen (2016) substantiated that training related to the startle effect can improve 
pilot performance.  The study considered a total of 40 crews (80 individual pilots). The 
participants were briefed that they will fly a profile in the simulator.  Twenty flight crews 
(40 individual pilots) received training on how to deal with a startle.  The training session 
included briefing and simulator practice.  During simulator flight, the events that led to 
the pilot’s being surprised, Gillen considered them as startle events.  It appears that there 
was discord over the definition of the terms surprise and startle.  As stated earlier, startle 
and surprise have different responses and they cannot be used in the same terminology. 
The study only considered two scenarios; however, there are ample scenarios to research. 
Physiological measurements for startle.  As stated earlier, startle is associated 
with high heart rate and blood pressure (FAA, 2015).  To date, no study has performed 
physiological measurements for pilots during a startling event.  Landman et al. (2017a) 
ascertained that different factors need to be manipulated to induce a startle or surprise.  A 
loud explosion or an abrupt sound can induce a startle.  When compared to a surprising 
event, a startling event more likely will lead to higher blood pressure and heart rate.  A 
startling event may also impact the respiration rate of pilots; however, there has been no 
study done to investigate those effects.    
Surprise 
The definition of surprise varies and depends on the context it is being used.  The 
basic definition of surprise as postulated by Bredehoeft (2005), is the gathering of new 
information that voids the original conceptual model.  Similarly, surprise is also defined 
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as a cognitive-emotional response to something unanticipated, which leads to a conflict 
between one’s expectation and awareness of one’s environment (Horstmann, 2006; 
Schützwohl, 1998).  Rivera et al. (2014) suggested that the main concern with surprise is 
that it can interrupt an ongoing task.  For example, Horstmann (2006) found that a 
surprising occurrence (unannounced visual event) hampered the continuous action of 
78% of the participants who were doing rapid alternate finger tapping.  In that study, the 
average duration of the interruption lasted about 1 s.  
 Surprise in aviation perspective.  According to IATA (2015a), surprise is 
defined as the emotionally based acceptance of a difference in what is actual and what 
was expected.  Similarly, as stated earlier, according to the FAA (2015), surprise is 
defined as an unexpected event that can influence the mental process of a pilot to respond 
to an emergency.  Congruently, Hilscher, Breiter, and Kochan (2012) found that flight 
crew (pilots) can be surprised due to an unexpected event during the flight that 
contradicts their expectations.  Casner et al. (2013) ascertained that pilots have 
considerable difficulties with applying learned procedures when they are surprised.  
Casner et al. showed that the time to respond to an event increases when this event comes 
abruptly.  The results of the study suggested pilots to stop testing and practicing 
unexpected events, in the same way, every time because it becomes excepted and 
predictable.  
 Automation surprise.  Present-day cockpit automation consists of auto-throttle, 
autopilot, flight management system, flight director, and multiple other systems 
(Moriarty, 2014).  These systems link together to ensure partially or fully automated 
flight when required.  Kochan et al. (2004) identified automation as one of the major 
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culprits in triggering flight deck surprises. 
According to Woods and Sarter (2002; as cited in de Boer and Hurts, 2017), three 
factors increase the probability of automation surprise: (a) acts by the automation without 
immediately preceding crew input, (b) gaps in the pilot’s mental representation on 
automation, and (c) sub-standard feedback of the automation.  Similarly, Dekker (2014) 
found that automation surprise is the outcome of an anomaly between one’s expectation 
and the actual system behavior.  This anomaly is only discovered when the crew notices 
an unexpected behavior on their part, which may already have led to serious 
consequences by that time.  
 De Boer and Hurts (2017) suggested that automation has increased in complexity, 
which has given rise to concerns.  The behavior of pilots when dealing with automation is 
unexplained in approximately 46% of the aircraft accident reports and 60% of major 
aircraft incident reports (PARC/CAST, 2013).  Congruently, EASA (2013) suggested that 
unanticipated events are one of the leading issues in-flight crew automation that requires 
attention.  The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) (2010), in the accident report of TA1951, 
found that the crew was completely taken by surprise because they were over-relying on 
the automation, which had failed their expectations.  The aircraft had a faulty altimeter 
that went unnoticed and led to a low altitude stall which crashed the aircraft.  De Boer 
and Hurts (2017) found that without AS, the mismatch between reality and the pilot's 
expectation continues until reality readjusts with the expectation without them ever 
knowing. 
Physiological measurements for surprise.  Landman et al. (2017b) and Bruna, 
Levora, and Holub (2018) recorded physiological measurements while pilots were flying 
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a surprise scenario in a flight simulator.  Landman et al. (2017b) did not find a significant 
difference in heart rate between a surprise and a normal condition.  However, they did 
find a significant difference in the skin conductance between the conditions.  Bruna et al. 
(2018) found a significant difference in the respiration rate between different phases of 
flight when flying with and without navigation.  The study also expected to see 
differences in the heart rate between the conditions, but those results are reported to 
another paper that is yet to be published. 
Loss of Control In-Flight 
 According to IATA (2015b), LOC-I is defined as the loss of an aircraft while it is 
in flight.  This also includes aerodynamics stalls and upsets following an aircraft system 
failure.  Gillen (2016) suggested that people often inaccurately associate landing and 
takeoff stage as the area with the highest risks.  Boeing (2019) found that LOC-I is the 
single largest category of fatalities from 2009 through 2018, accounting for 1181 
fatalities from 13 accidents. 
According to Gillen (2016), most of the LOC-I accidents were the outcome of an 
unexpected event at the beginning of the accident timeline.  LOC-I can begin suddenly 
following an inappropriate decision by the pilots.  Similarly, Landman et al. (2017b) 
suggested that several of these events have been associated with inappropriate responses 
of the flight crew, and it is commonly suspected that surprise and startle contribute to 
such inappropriate responses (NTSB, 2010; BEA, 2012; DSB, 2010).  Landman et al. 
(2017a) found that several recent flight safety events involving LOC-I, the 
unexpectedness of the situation is thought to have induced startle complicating the crew’s 
troubleshooting (Martin et al., 2016). 
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Training and Unanticipated Events 
 The accident reports of AF447, CA3407, and TA1951 ascertain that the repose of 
pilots to an unanticipated event was different from the way they were trained.  A study 
conducted by Martin et al. (2014) found pilots that did not receive startle and surprise 
training performed inappropriately or ineffectively.  Alternately, pilots that received 
startle and surprise training performed effectively.  Similarly, Casner et al. (2012) 
ascertained that there were considerable delays in the responses of pilots following an 
unexpected event.  Congruently, Gillen (2016) found that pilots receiving startle training 
performed better during unexpected scenarios than pilots not receiving any training. 
Gillen (2016) suggested that the training of airline pilots has become predictable 
in the current regulatory environment.  Presently, the training will transfer well to 
predictable situations like the tests and most likely will not help during an actual 
emergency (Landman, van Oorschot, van Paassen, Groen, Bronkhorst, & Mulder, 2018).  
However, the FAA (2013) suggested different training scenarios with the emphasis on 
different areas, including startle and surprise.  The design of the training scenarios is to 
provide the crew with a startle experience, which allows for the effective recovery of the 
airplane during an emergency.  Similarly, the FAA (2017) also suggested training 
scenarios with the emphasis on startle and surprise.  
Further, it was suggested that the flight instructors should plan upset scenarios 
that are likely to result in a startle or surprise.  Finally, for the training to be beneficial, it 
should cover unexpected events over a wide array of circumstances and operations 
parameters (Casner et al., 2012).  Presently there is no mandatory training for startle and 
surprise.  However, Landman et al. (2018) hope that training will become mandatory in 
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the near future.  A potential gap in the literature is that few studies have proposed flight 
simulator scenarios that can startle and surprise pilots.  
Workload Measurement using NASA-TLX 
 The NASA-TLX is a widely used tool to measure workload.  The NASA-TLX 
has six subjective scales that are represented on a single page and include: (a) mental 
demand, (b) physical demand, (c) temporal demand, (d) performance, (e) effort, and  
(f) frustration (NASA, 1986).  Workload measured using NASA-TLX is self-evaluated 
and is limited to the perception of the participant regarding the task (Fernandes & 
Braarud, 2015).  The complexity and environment of a task can influence the workload.  
Therefore, during startle and surprise emergencies, it is fair to expect the workload score 
to go up when compared to an informed emergency.  To date, no study has evaluated the 
workload of the pilot during emergencies that can be startling and surprising.  However, 
Suppiah (2019) evaluated the workload using NASA-TLX during unexpected scenarios 
where the pilots were using electronic and then paper charts.  The unexpected scenarios 
in this study might be surprising; however, they were not considered as a surprise 
emergency.  
Summary 
 This literature review intended to provide the readers with an extensive 
background on which to base the study.  The literature discussed the role of humans as 
supervisors of automation.  It is known that humans over-rely on automated systems, 
which is the basis for automation bias.  Similarly, automation tends to miss information 
or issue false alarms.  The processing of information in automated systems was discussed 
in detail with the help of SDT.   
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 Further, the literature also discussed surprise and startle and related it to the 
aviation industry.  The consequences of startle and automation surprise on the pilot's 
performance were then discussed while relating it to some recent LOC-I incidents.  The 
focus of the literature review was on the lack of training that airline pilots received and 
how proposing realistic scenarios can help with startle and surprise training.  Potential 
gaps found during the literature review included the lack of studies that proposed flight 
simulator scenarios that can startle and surprise pilots.  Also, few studies did measure 
vital signs such as HR and RR but only during surprise events.  Among the few studies, 
the focus of all was on commercial airline pilots.  Though airline pilots are important, if 
the training scenarios are practiced while pilots finish their training before flying for 
commercial airlines, it can ensure pilots are proficient in multiple potential scenarios that 
can be startling and surprising.  Lastly, no study assessed the pilot workload during startle 
and surprise events.  
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
The methodology presented in this chapter supports the procedures used to 
investigate scenarios that can induce startle and surprise in pilots.  In the current study, 
participants were asked to fly six scenarios in a BATD during which their HR and RR 
were recorded.  After each flight, participants completed the NASA-TLX and an open-
ended question, see Appendix C.  Before data collection, permission to conduct the 
research was applied to the Institutional Review Board at ERAU, which was granted.  
The IRB approval and informed consent form are shown in Appendices A and B, 
respectively.  This chapter provided the readers with an overview of the methods used. 
Population/Sample 
Forty (36 males and 4 females) commercial pilots with single-engine and multi-
engine ratings participated in this study.  The participants were selected using 
convenience sampling from a pool of commercial pilots at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University (ERAU).  Participants were recruited using email announcements and paper 
flyers.  Each participant who completed the study was paid $20.   
 Apparatus and materials.  Six flight scenarios were created on an Elite PI-135 
BATD using X-Plane 11 software.  The health vitals HR and RR were recorded using the 
Nexus 10 device (MindMedia Inc., NL) that sampled at 1024 Hz and transmitted data to 
the data-acquisition computer via a cable.  This study used the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) for statistical analysis of the data. 
Design and procedures.  This study was an experimental within-subject design. 
There were two independent variables (aircraft and emergency scenario) and eight 
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dependent variables.  The aircraft variable had two levels and the emergency scenario 
variable had three levels making it a 2 x 3 within-subjects design.  The IVs and DVs are 
shown in Figure 1.  The purpose of the study was not disclosed to the participants, who 
were informed that they would fly an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach at 
Daytona Beach International Airport (DAB).  When the study concluded, each participant 
was debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
 
 
Figure 2. The independent and dependent variables for this study. 
 
 
 
 In the BATD, each participant flew six flight scenarios, where three configured as 
a C172SP and three configured as a Beechcraft Baron 58.  Twenty participants flew three 
flights configured as a Baron aircraft followed by three flights in the Cessna; the other 
half flew Cessna, followed by the Baron.  To induce startle, the researcher introduced 
loud bang and thunder sound during the simulation, where 20 participants heard a loud 
bang in the Baron and thunder noise in the Cessna, while the other half heard thunder 
sound in Baron and loud bang in Cessna.  The sounds were played from a distance of 
0.89 meters using a speaker that lasted 1 to 2 s, and a sound meter was used to measure 
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the sounds in dB.  The thunder sound was 85-89 dB, while the loud bang sound was 87-
91 dB.  Due to the unfamiliarity of most participants with the Baron, the researcher had 
them all fly a practice flight.  The practice flight was a 3 nautical mile (nm) visual 
approach to 25R DAB.  The researcher asked the pilots to maneuver the aircraft, increase 
and decrease speed using the throttle, climb and descent, and eventually land the aircraft.   
 After each flight, the researcher had the participant complete the NASA-TLX and 
an open-ended question.  The NASA-TLX has six subjective scales which are rated on a 
scale of 1-20.  A score of 1 is equivalent to the lowest possible workload, while a score of 
20 is equivalent to the highest possible workload.  An open-ended question “Which 
options best describes your perception of the task? (Check all that apply)” was used as a 
manipulation check where all participants were asked their perception about the three 
emergency scenarios for both aircraft, participants were asked if they found the 
emergency surprising, startling, both, or neither.  The performance of the participants 
while flying was logged by the X-Plane software and evaluated differently for each 
aircraft.  The description of the flight simulator scenarios for each aircraft is shown in 
Tables 1 and 2.  The reason for having engine failure for Cessna at 1500 feet was to give 
the participant’s time to initiate the checklist.  For the multi-engine aircraft the engine 
failure was at 450 feet because the researcher had set up conditions for a missed approach 
(decision altitude = 234 feet) and having an engine failure at a high altitude would have 
resulted in some participants just flying the aircraft level to troubleshoot the problem, 
while some participants could have just aborted the landing.  For the purpose of this 
study, the decision altitude used to evaluate the performance was changed to 180 feet as 
the participants were flying six-pack configuration.  
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Table 1 
Description of BATD Emergency Scenarios for Baron 58 
Scenario Scenario Parameters Scenario Description 
Uninformed Surprise 
Emergency 
3 nm ILS approach to  
25R DAB 
Engine failure at 450 feet 
with runway not visible at 
minimum 
Uninformed Surprise and 
Startle Emergency 
3 nm ILS approach to  
25R DAB 
Engine failure at 450 feet 
with runway not visible at 
minimum. A loud bang or 
thunder sound at different 
altitudes 
Informed Emergency 3 nm ILS approach to  
25R DAB 
Engine failure at 450 feet 
with runway not visible at 
minimum, go missed 
Note. 20 participants heard the loud bang while 20 participants heard the thunder sound 
(with lightning simulated by turning the light on and off multiple times) in  
Baron uninformed surprise and startle emergency scenario.  
Startle stimulus was introduced at 600, 500, 450, 400, 300 feet. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Description of Flight BATD Emergency Scenarios for C172SP 
Scenario Scenario Parameters Scenario Description 
Uninformed Surprise 
Emergency 
10 nm ILS approach to 
25R DAB 
Engine failure at 1500 feet 
with cloud layer set at 
1000 feet 
Uninformed Surprise and 
Startle Emergency 
10 nm ILS approach to 
25R DAB 
Engine failure at 1500 feet 
and engine fire at 1000 
feet. A loud bang or 
thunder sound at different 
altitudes 
Informed Emergency 10 nm ILS approach to 
25R DAB 
Engine failure at 1500 feet 
with a cloud layer set at 
1000 feet 
Note. 20 participants heard the loud bang while 20 participants heard the thunder sound 
(with lightning simulated by turning the light on and off multiple times) in  
Cessna uninformed surprise and startle emergency scenario.  
Startle stimulus was introduced at 1700, 1500, 1400, 1300, 1000 feet. 
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Sources of the Data 
 
The HR and RR were measured at 32 samples per second using Nexus 10, which 
has been used in multiple published research studies.  The performance of the participants 
for Cessna was measured by the number of checklist steps following an engine failure.  
The performance for Baron was measured in terms of deviation after crossing the 
decision altitude of 180 feet.  Participants with an altitude of 180 or more deviated 0 feet 
from the decision altitude.  The altitude was recorded by X-Plane software at five 
samples per second, which the researcher extracted after each flight.  The workload and 
open-ended questions for each scenario were collected using a paper copy of the NASA-
TLX.  
Instrument reliability.  The Elite-PI 135 BATD was successfully used in 
multiple published studies (Dattel et al., 2019; Suppiah, 2019) and is an FAA approved 
BATD.  A pilot study was done using the BATD with a subject matter expert (SME) 
acting as the participant, who was satisfied with the functionality of the BATD and found 
the scenario parameters realistic.  The SME was a full-time flight instructor with the 
ERAU flight department. 
Bruna et al. (2018) measured the reparation rate of pilots while flying an 
emergency scenario using Nexus 10.  Nexus 10 is being widely used in clinical research, 
and numerous studies have been conducted using this device (Bruna et al., 2018; 
Schuman & Killian, 2019). 
Instrument validity.  The NASA-TLX, Nexus 10, and the Elite-PI BATD are all 
valid instruments that are being used in different studies (Bruna et al., 2018; Dattel et al., 
2019, & Suppiah, 2019).  However, to ensure that all these devices were measuring what 
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the researcher intended them to measure, the researcher manipulated both IVs.  The order 
was counterbalanced by having half participants fly the Cessna followed by the Baron, 
and having the other half fly the Baron followed by the Cessna.  For each aircraft, the 
first flight was an uninformed surprise emergency, the second flight was an uninformed 
startle and surprise emergency, and the third flight was informed emergency.   
It was not possible to fully counterbalance the order of the emergency as that 
would have disclosed the emergency to the participant.  However, the order of the two 
noise conditions was counterbalanced to counter an order effect due to the noise type 
where half the participants flying Cessna heard a loud bang while the other half heard 
thunder (lightning simulated by turning the light on and off).  Conversely, half the 
participants flying the startle and surprise uninformed emergency in the Baron heard a 
loud bang while the other half heard thunder (lightning simulated by turning the light on 
and off).   
Treatment of the Data 
The HR and RR were recorded for all six flights using Nexus 10, and the output 
was saved as an Excel file where the researcher calculated the mean HR (beats per 
minute) and RR (breaths per minute), which the researcher entered in the main Excel data 
file.  In the main data file, the researcher then entered the NASA-TLX self-assessed 
scores and the answer to the open-ended question for all six flights, asking participants 
about their perception task.  The NASA-TLX scores were on a scale of 1 to 20, while the 
open-ended question had four possible answers (surprising, startling, both, or neither).  
The number of checklist steps followed after engine failure for the Cessna aircraft was 
reported on paper by the researcher and then entered in the main data file for each 
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participant.  For the Baron aircraft, the altitude at which the missed approach was 
initiated was entered, which the researcher extracted from X-plane software.  X- Plane 
recorded the altitude in a text file that the researcher had to open, then visually see the 
altitude and enter it in the main data file for each participant.  The data in the excel file 
was then open using the SPSS where the researcher then evaluated the data.  All the data 
was rounded to 2 decimal places for consistency.    
Descriptive statistics.  The study presented the means and standard deviation for 
the HR, RR, and workload factors.  Participant demographic and their answer to the 
open-ended question were also presented using pictorial representation. 
Hypothesis testing.  For the purpose of this research, the researcher evaluated 
each of the following 26 null hypotheses using a 2 x 3 with-subjects ANOVA.  Post hoc 
tests were run for all significant interactions and significant main effect for emergency. 
H01: There was no significant difference in heart rate between flying a single-engine and 
flying a multi-engine aircraft.  
H02: There were no significant differences in heart rate among an uninformed surprise 
emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency 
H03: There were no significant interactions in heart rate between the aircraft and the 
emergency scenario. 
H04: There was no significant difference in respiration rate between flying a single-
engine and flying a multi-engine aircraft.  
H05: There were no significant differences in respiration rate among an uninformed 
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency 
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H06: There were no significant interactions in respiration rate between the aircraft and the 
emergency scenario. 
H07: There was no significant difference in mental demand between flying a single-
engine and multi-engine aircraft.  
H08: There were no significant differences in mental demand among an uninformed 
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency 
H09: There were no significant interactions in mental demand between the aircraft and 
the emergency scenario. 
H010: There was no significant difference in physical demand between flying a single-
engine and multi-engine aircraft. 
H011: There were no significant differences in physical demand between an uninformed 
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency 
H012: There were no significant interactions in physical demand between the aircraft and 
the emergency scenario. 
H013: There was no significant difference in temporal demand between flying a single-
engine and multi-engine aircraft. 
H014: There were no significant differences in temporal demand between an uninformed 
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency 
H015: There were no significant interactions in temporal demand between the aircraft and 
the emergency scenario. 
H016: There was no significant difference in subjective performance between flying a 
single-engine and multi-engine aircraft. 
H017: There were no significant differences in subjective performance between an  
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uninformed surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and 
informed emergency 
H018: There were no significant interactions in subjective performance between the 
aircraft and the emergency scenario. 
H019: There was no significant difference in effort between flying a single-engine and 
multi-engine aircraft. 
H020: There were no significant differences in effort between an uninformed surprise 
emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency 
H021: There were no significant interactions in effort between the aircraft and the 
emergency scenario. 
H022: There was no significant difference in frustration between flying a single-engine 
and multi-engine aircraft. 
H023: There were no significant differences in frustration between an uninformed 
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency 
H024: There were no significant interactions in frustration between the aircraft and the 
emergency scenario. 
 One-way repeated-measures ANOVAs were run to test the following null 
hypotheses.  A Bonferroni post hoc was run if the ANOVA was significant. 
H025: There were no significant differences in flight performance among the emergency 
scenarios for the multi-engine aircraft as measured by altitude deviation. 
H026: There were no significant differences in flight performance among the emergency 
scenarios for the single-engine aircraft as measured by the number of engine-failure 
checklist steps followed. 
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 Qualitative analysis.  Participants (N = 25) that had the startle reflex or seemed 
surprised were asked if they wish to provide their narrative of the flight simulator 
scenarios and answer questions asked by the researcher.  The researcher visually 
observed startle reflex which was associated with fast eye blinks, head ducks, or shoulder 
squat up.  While surprise was associated with small gasps, sudden onset of anger, or a 
verbalization of what was being felt. 
The questions were specific to the pilot’s behavior while flying.  For example, 
most participants were asked the reason for not initiating a go-around at the decision 
altitude for the multi-engine aircraft.  Similarly, participants were asked the reason for 
not turning the fuel selector off during engine fire for the single-engine aircraft.  Lastly, 
most participants were also asked why their performance was the best while flying the 
informed emergency condition.  The researcher used the narrative of the pilots to 
interpret the results of the study. 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
 This chapter presents the results for this study, which include descriptive and 
inferential statistics.  Based on the results of null hypothesis testing, decisions to either 
retain or reject the null hypothesis were made (using a criteria of α = .05).  The 
assumptions for each statistical test were tested, and if any assumption were violated, 
appropriate measures were taken. 
Descriptive Statistics  
Forty participants (male: n = 36, female: n = 4) participated in this study.  All 
participants were asked about their perception of the emergency.  For all three 
emergencies for both aircraft, participants were asked if they found the emergency 
surprising, startling, both, or neither.  The results for participant perception are presented 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Participant Perception of Emergency Scenario Based on Aircraft 
 
Note. N = 40.  
 
Variable Multi-Engine Single-Engine 
Surprising Startling Both Neither Surprising Startling Both Neither 
Uninformed 
Surprise 
22 5 9 4 26 2 5 7 
Uninformed 
Surprise and 
Startle 
 
8 9 20 3 10 8 20 2 
Informed 6 4 2 28 3 4 3 30 
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Non-parametric Statistics for Manipulation Check 
 For each scenario, a chi-square goodness of fit test was run as a manipulation 
check.  Distributions of the four possible responses from the participant perception 
question about the scenario are shown in Table 3.   
 Uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft.  A chi-square 
goodness of fit was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for 
uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft occurred with equal 
probabilities.  The test showed a significant discrepancy in the distributions of observed 
and expected frequencies, χ2(3, N = 40) = 20.60, p < .001.  The scenario was surprising 
for 55% of the participants, while the second common response was surprising and 
startling (both), which accounted for 22.5% of the participants.  
Uninformed surprise and startle emergency for multi-engine aircraft.  A chi-
square goodness of fit was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for 
uninformed surprise and startle emergency for multi-engine aircraft occurred with equal 
probabilities.  The test showed a significant discrepancy in the distributions of observed 
and expected frequencies, χ2(3, N = 40) = 15.40, p = .002.  The scenario was surprising 
and startling (both) for 50% of the participants, while the second common response was 
startling, which accounted for 22.5% of the participants. 
Informed emergency for multi-engine aircraft.  A chi-square goodness of fit 
was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for informed emergency for 
multi-engine aircraft occurred with equal probabilities.  The test showed a significant 
discrepancy in the distributions of observed and expected frequencies,  
χ2(3, N = 40) = 44.00, p < .001.  The scenario was neither surprising nor startling 
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(neither) for 70% of the participants, while the second common response was surprising 
which accounted for 15% of the participants. 
Uninformed surprise emergency for single-engine aircraft.  A chi-square 
goodness of fit was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for 
uninformed surprise emergency for single-engine aircraft occurred with equal 
probabilities.  The test showed a significant discrepancy in the distributions of observed 
and expected frequencies, χ2(3, N = 40) = 35.40, p < .001.  The scenario was surprising 
for 65% of the participants, while the second common response was neither surprising 
nor startling (neither), which accounted for 17.5% of the participants.  
Uninformed surprise and startle emergency for single-engine aircraft.  A chi-
square goodness of fit was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for 
uninformed surprise and startle emergency for multi-engine aircraft occurred with equal 
probabilities.  The test showed a significant discrepancy in the distributions of observed 
and expected frequencies, χ2(3, N = 40) = 16.80, p = .001.  The scenario was surprising 
and startling (both) for 50% of the participants, while the second common response was 
surprising which accounted for 25% of the participants. 
Informed emergency for single-engine aircraft.  A chi-square goodness of fit 
was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for informed emergency for 
single-engine aircraft occurred with equal probabilities.  The test showed a significant 
discrepancy in the distributions of observed and expected frequencies,  
χ2(3, N = 40) = 53.40, p < .001.  The scenario was neither surprising nor surprising 
(neither) for 75% of the participants, while the second common response was startling 
which accounted for 10% of the participants. 
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Since all six chi-square goodness of fit tests were significant, all the null 
hypotheses were rejected (p < .05); there were significant differences among the 
distributions of perception responses (surprise, startle, both, and neither) in different 
aircraft and emergency scenario conditions. 
Inferential Statistics  
Heart rate and respiration rate.  Separate 2 x 3 with-subjects ANOVAs were 
run to assess the effects of aircraft and emergency on HR and RR.  The descriptive and 
inferential statistics are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for HR and RR for Emergency Condition and Aircraft 
 Multi-engine Single-engine 
M SD M SD 
Heart Rate     
Uninformed Surprise 
 
82.33 9.94 79.59 8.27 
Uninformed Surprise 
and Startle  
 
86.19 9.49 81.91 8.08 
Informed  
 
79.54 8.42 77.63 7.54 
Total 82.69 8.78 79.71 7.43 
Respiration Rate 
 
    
Uninformed Surprise  
 
22.36 3.09 20.90 2.72 
Uninformed Surprise 
and Startle  
 
23.72 3.18 21.44 2.83 
Informed  
 
20.80 2.84 19.90 2.63 
Total 22.30 2.69 20.75 2.50 
Note. N = 40. M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 5 
Two-Way ANOVA Statistics for HR and RR 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 ANOVA 
Effect MSE F  df p-value      ηp2 
Heart Rate  
 A* 532.82 9.03 1, 39 .005 0.191 
 B** 736.61 33.35a 1.63, 63.61 < .001 0.461 
 
 A x B* 28.95 3.36 2, 78 .040 0.082 
Respiration Rate 
 A** 143.38 22.95 1, 39 < .001 0.371 
 B** 137.57 34.64a 1.45, 56.68 < .001 0.471 
 
 A x B* 9.72 5.16 2, 78 .008 0.122 
Note. N = 40. A = aircraft; B = emergency; MSE = mean squared error; df = degrees of 
freedom; ANOVA = analysis of variance; ηp2= partial eta square. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. a Assumption of sphericity violated, thus an adjustment to df was 
made using Greenhouse Geisser. 1 large effect. 2 medium effect.  
 
 
 
Heart rate post hoc results for main effect of emergency.  Using the Bonferroni 
post hoc, the mean heart rate of uninformed surprise emergency (M = 80.96, SD = 8.46) 
was significantly lower than the mean heart rate of uninformed surprise and startle 
emergency (M = 84.05, SD = 8.09, p < .001).  The mean heart rate of informed 
emergency (M = 78.59, SD = 7.06) was significantly lower than the mean heart rate of 
uninformed surprise emergency (p = .002) and the mean heart rate of uninformed surprise 
and startle emergency (p < .001).  See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Mean heart rate with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on 
emergency.  
 
 
 
Heart rate post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency).  Using a paired 
sample t-test (testwise α = .017, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean heart rate of the 
uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the 
mean heart rate of the uninformed surprise emergency for single-engine aircraft (p = 
.016).  Similarly, the mean heart rate of the uninformed surprise and startle emergency 
for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean heart rate of the 
uninformed emergency for single-engine aircraft (p < .001).  However, no significant 
difference in mean heart rate in the informed emergency condition was found between 
the single- and multi-engine aircraft (p > .016).  See Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Mean heart rate for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft based on 
emergency. 
 
 
 
Respiration rate post hoc results for main effect of emergency.  Using the 
Bonferroni post hoc, the mean respiration rate of uninformed surprise emergency (M = 
21.63, SD = 2.62) was significantly lower than the mean respiration rate of uninformed 
surprise and startle emergency (M = 22.58, SD = 2.76, p = .001).  The mean respiration 
rate of informed emergency (M = 20.40, SD = 2.54) was significantly lower than the 
respiration rate of uninformed surprise emergency (p < .001) and the mean respiration 
rate of uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001).  No other significant 
differences were found (p > .05).  See Figure 5. 
   45 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean respiration rate with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on 
emergency.  
 
 
 
Respiration rate post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency).  Using a 
paired sample t-test (testwise α = .016, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean respiration rate 
of the uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher 
than the mean respiration rate of the uninformed surprise emergency for single-engine 
aircraft (p = .001).  Similarly, the mean respiration rate of the uninformed surprise and 
startle emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean 
respiration rate of the uninformed emergency for single-engine aircraft (p < .001).  
However, no significant difference in mean respiration rate was found in the informed 
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emergency condition between the single- and multi-engine aircraft (p > .016). These 
results are depicted in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean respiration rate for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft based on 
emergency. 
 
 
 
Mental, physical, and temporal demand (subjective).  Three separate 2 x 3 
repeated-measures ANOVAs were run to assess the effects of aircraft and emergency on 
the following dependent variables; (a) mental demand, (b) physical demand, and (c) 
temporal demand.  The descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in Table 6 and 7 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
   47 
 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Mental, Physical, and Temporal Demand for Emergency 
Condition and Aircraft 
 
 Multi-engine Single-engine 
M SD M SD 
Mental Demand      
Uninformed Surprise 
 
13.27 4.69 11.08 4.50 
Uninformed Surprise 
and Startle  
 
14.72 4.50 13.85 4.57 
Informed  
 
11.15 4.63 8.30 4.64 
Total 13.05 4.17 11.07 4.02 
Physical Demand 
 
    
Uninformed Surprise  
 
9.33 4.42 8.05 4.81 
Uninformed Surprise 
and Startle  
 
12.53 4.96 9.80 4.65 
Informed Emergency 
 
10.05 5.05 7.05 4.72 
Total 10.63 4.46 8.30 4.43 
Temporal Demand 
 
    
Uninformed Surprise  
 
13.58 4.73 8.22 5.07 
Uninformed Surprise 
and Startle  
 
13.43 5.12 12.83 4.68 
Informed  
 
10.45 5.07 7.90 4.78 
Total 12.48 4.27 9.65 4.04 
Note. N = 40. M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 7 
Two-Way ANOVA Statistics for Mental Demand, Physical Demand, and Temporal 
Demand 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 ANOVA 
Effect MSE F  df p-value ηp2 
Mental Demand  
 A** 234.04 12.58 1, 39 .001 0.241 
 B** 417.09 64.87 2, 78 < .001 0.621 
 
 
A x B* 20.26 3.22 2, 78 .045 0.082 
Physical Demand  
 A** 326.68 25.93 1, 39 < .001 0.401 
 B** 172.93 38.63 2, 78 < .001 0.501 
       
 A x B* 17.18 3.69 2, 78 .029 0.092 
Temporal Demand       
 A** 481.67 17.31 1, 39 < .001 0.311 
 B** 313.72 37.79 2, 78 < .001 0.491 
 A x B** 114.02 9.32 2, 78 < .001 0.191 
Note. N = 40. A = aircraft; B = emergency; MSE = mean squared error; df = degrees of 
freedom; ANOVA = analysis of variance; ηp2= partial eta square. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 1 large effect. 2 medium effect. 
 
Mental demand post hoc results for main effect of emergency.  Using the 
Bonferroni post hoc, the mean mental demand of uninformed surprise emergency (M = 
12.17, SD = 4.06) was significantly lower than the mean mental demand of uninformed 
surprise and startle emergency (M = 14.29, SD = 4.09, p < .001).  The mean mental 
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demand of informed emergency (M = 9.72, SD = 3.78) was significantly lower than the 
mean mental demand of uninformed surprise emergency (p < .001) and the mean mental 
demand of uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001).  See Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean mental demand with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on 
emergency.  
 
 
 
Mental demand post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency).  Using a 
paired sample t-test (testwise α = .016, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean mental demand 
of the uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher 
than the mean mental demand of the uninformed surprise emergency for single-engine 
aircraft (p = .003).  Similarly, the mean mental demand of the informed emergency for 
multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean mental demand of the 
informed emergency for single-engine aircraft (p = .002).  However, no significant 
difference in mean mental demand were found in the uninformed surprise and startle 
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emergency condition between single- and multi-engine aircraft (p > .016).  These results 
are depicted in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. Mean mental demand for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft based on 
emergency. 
 
 
 
Physical demand post hoc results for main effect of emergency.  Using the 
Bonferroni post hoc, the mean physical demand of uninformed surprise emergency  
(M = 8.69, SD = 4.18) was significantly lower than the mean physical demand of 
uninformed surprise and startle emergency (M = 11.16, SD = 4.37, p < .001).  The mean 
physical demand of informed emergency (M = 8.55, SD = 4.56) was significantly lower 
than the mean physical demand of the uninformed surprise and startle emergency  
(p < .001).  There was no significant difference in mean physical demand between the 
uninformed surprise emergency and the informed emergency (p > .05).  See Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Mean physical demand with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on 
emergency. 
 
 
 
Physical demand post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency).  Using a 
paired sample t-test (testwise α = .016, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean physical 
demand of the uninformed surprise and startle for multi-engine aircraft was significantly 
higher than the mean physical demand of the uninformed surprise and startle and for 
single-engine aircraft (p < .001).  Similarly, mean physical demand of the informed 
emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean physical 
demand of the informed emergency for single-engine aircraft (p < .001).  However, there 
was no significant difference between the aircraft for the uninformed surprise condition 
(p > .016).  These results are depicted in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10. Mean physical demand for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft based on 
emergency. 
 
 
 
Temporal demand post hoc results for main effect of emergency.  Using the 
Bonferroni post hoc, the mean temporal demand of uninformed surprise emergency  
(M = 10.90, SD = 3.89) was significantly lower than the mean temporal demand of 
uninformed surprise and startle emergency (M = 13.12, SD = 3.63, p < .001).  The mean 
temporal demand of informed emergency (M = 9.17, SD = 4.23) was significantly lower 
than the mean temporal demand of uninformed surprise emergency (p = .002) and the 
mean temporal demand of uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001).  See 
Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Mean temporal demand with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on 
emergency.  
 
 
 
Temporal demand post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency).  Using 
a paired sample t-test (testwise α = .016, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean temporal 
demand of the uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly 
higher than the mean temporal demand of the uninformed surprise emergency for single-
engine aircraft (p < .001).  Similarly, the mean temporal demand of the informed 
emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean temporal 
demand of the informed emergency for single-engine aircraft (p = .003).  However, no 
significant differences were found in mean temporal demand in the uninformed surprise 
and startle emergency condition between the single- and multi-engine aircraft (p > .016). 
These results are depicted in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. Mean temporal demand for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft based on 
emergency. 
 
 
 
Subjective performance, effort, and frustration.  Three separate 2 x 3 repeated-
measures ANOVAs were run to assess the effects of aircraft and emergency on the 
following dependent variables; (a) subjective performance, (b) effort, and (c) frustration.  
The descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in Table 8 and 9 respectively. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Subjective Performance, Effort, and Frustration for Emergency 
Condition and Aircraft 
 
 Multi-engine Single-engine 
M SD M SD 
Subjective Performance      
Uninformed Surprise 
 
15.20 4.78 13.03 4.91 
Uninformed Surprise 
and Startle  
 
16.70 3.90 14.33 3.85 
Informed  
 
11.98 5.08 6.67 4.45 
Total 14.63 3.19 11.34 3.29 
Effort 
 
    
Uninformed Surprise  
 
12.70 4.40 10.67 4.42 
Uninformed Surprise 
and Startle  
 
15.28 4.37 12.67 4.53 
Informed Emergency 
 
11.67 3.93 9.15 4.43 
Total 13.22 3.35 10.83 3.88 
Frustration 
 
    
Uninformed Surprise  
 
13.15 5.33 9.75 5.67 
Uninformed Surprise 
and Startle  
 
14.78 5.45 12.18 5.50 
Informed  
 
70.23 5.28 7.03 4.65 
Total 12.72 4.70 9.65 4.51 
Note. N = 40. M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
 
 
   56 
 
Table 9 
Two-Way ANOVA Statistics for Subjective Performance, Effort, and Frustration 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
                 ANOVA 
Effect MSE F  df p-value ηp2 
Subjective 
Performance 
 
 A** 646.82 23.01 1, 39 < .001 0.371 
 B** 842.20 66.00 2, 78 < .001 0.631 
 A x B* 61.20 3.60 2, 78 .032 0.082 
Effort  
 A** 340.82 18.83 1, 39 < .001 0.331 
 B** 260.66 27.88 2, 78 < .001 0.411 
 A x Bns & a 2.26 0.25 1.73, 67.35 > .05 - 
Frustration       
 A** 564.27 39.93 1, 39 < .001 0.511 
 B** 474.72 44.16 2, 78 < .001 0.531 
 A x Bns 3.47 0.32 2, 78 > .05 - 
Note. N = 40. A = aircraft; B = emergency; MSE = mean squared error; df = degrees of 
freedom; ANOVA = analysis of variance; ηp2= partial eta square. 
a Assumption of sphericity violated, thus an adjustment to df was made using Greenhouse 
Geisser. ns Not significant (p > .05). 1 large effect. 2 medium effect. 
 
 
 
Subjective performance post hoc results for main effect of emergency.  Using 
the Bonferroni post hoc, the mean subjective performance of uninformed surprise 
emergency (M = 14.11, SD = 3.19) was significantly lower than the mean performance of 
uninformed surprise and startle emergency (M = 15.51, SD = 2.60, p .029).  The mean 
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subjective performance of informed emergency (M = 9.32, SD = 3.64) was significantly 
lower than the mean subjective performance of uninformed surprise emergency  
(p < .001) and the mean subjective performance of uninformed surprise and startle 
emergency (p < .001).  See Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13. Mean subjective performance with error bars (standard error of the mean) 
based on emergency. 
 
 
 
Subjective performance post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency).  
Using a paired sample t-test (testwise α = .016, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean 
subjective performance of the uninformed surprise and startle emergency for multi-
engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean subjective performance of the 
uninformed surprise and startle emergency for single-engine aircraft (p = .013).  
Similarly, the mean subjective performance of the informed emergency for multi-engine 
aircraft was significantly higher than the mean subjective performance of the informed 
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emergency for single-engine aircraft (p < .001).  However, there was no significant 
difference in mean subjective performance in the uninformed surprise emergency 
condition between the single- and multi-engine aircraft (p > .016).  These results are 
depicted in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14. Mean subjective performance for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft 
based on emergency. 
 
Effort post hoc results for main effect of emergency.  Using the Bonferroni post 
hoc, the mean effort of uninformed surprise emergency (M = 11.69, SD = 3.59) was 
significantly lower than the mean effort of uninformed surprise and startle emergency 
(M = 13.97, SD = 3.61, p < .001).  The mean effort of informed emergency  
(M = 10.41, SD = 3.70) was significantly lower than the mean effort of uninformed 
surprise emergency (p = .033) and the mean effort of uninformed surprise and startle 
emergency (p < .001).  See Figure 15. 
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Figure 15. Mean effort with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on emergency.  
 
 
 
Frustration post hoc results for main effect of emergency.  Using the Bonferroni 
post hoc, the mean frustration of uninformed surprise emergency (M = 11.45, SD = 4.76) 
was significantly lower than the mean frustration of uninformed surprise and startle 
emergency (M = 13.47, SD = 4.80, p = .001).  The mean frustration of the informed 
emergency (M = 8.62, SD = 4.69) was significantly lower than the mean frustration of the 
uninformed surprise emergency (p < .001) and the mean frustration of uninformed 
surprise and startle emergency (p < .001).  See Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Mean frustration with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on 
emergency.  
 
 
Checklist Compliance Results for Single-Engine Aircraft 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis 
that there would be no significant difference in the number of checklist steps followed 
among emergency conditions in the single-engine aircraft condition. The assumption of 
sphericity was tested.  Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not significant (p > .05).  The 
number of engine failure checklist steps followed between the emergencies significantly 
varied, F(2, 78) = 106.10, p < .001, η2 = .73 (large effect size).  The Bonferroni post hoc 
showed that the mean number of checklist steps followed for uninformed surprise 
emergency was significantly greater than the mean number of checklist steps followed for 
uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001).  The mean number of checklist 
steps followed for an informed emergency was significantly greater than the mean 
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number of checklist steps followed for uninformed surprise emergency (p < .001) and 
uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001).  The means and standard 
deviations of the checklist steps followed based on emergency type are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Mean Number of Checklist Steps Followed for Single-Engine 
Aircraft 
 
Emergency Condition M SD 
Uninformed Surprise 
Emergency 
 
3.40 2.16 
Uninformed Surprise 
and Startle Emergency 
 
1.82 1.63 
Informed Emergency 6.80 1.80 
Note. N = 40. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation.  
 
 
 
Flight Performance Results for Multi-Engine Aircraft 
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis 
that there would be no significant difference in altitude deviation among the emergency 
conditions.  The assumption of sphericity was tested.  Mauchly’s test of sphericity was 
not significant (p > .05).  The altitude deviation between the emergencies significantly 
varied, F(2, 78) = 67.34, p < .001, η2 = .63 (large effect size).  The Bonferroni post hoc 
indicted that the mean altitude deviation for uninformed surprise emergency was 
significantly less than the mean altitude deviation for uninformed surprise and startle 
emergency (p = .043).  The mean altitude deviation for an informed emergency was 
significantly less than the mean altitude deviation for uninformed surprise emergency  
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(p < .001) and uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001).  The means and 
standard deviations of the altitude deviation for emergencies are depicted in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Altitude Deviation for Multi-Engine Aircraft  
Emergency Condition M SD 
Uninformed Surprise 
Emergency 
 
122.12 49.93 
Uninformed Surprise 
and Startle Emergency 
 
147.77 46.43 
Informed Emergency 27.35 50.32 
Note. N = 40. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation.  
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Chapter V 
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The results are discussed in this chapter by giving a wider insight into the possible 
reasons for the findings.  Since the topic under investigation is a relatively new area of 
research, the researcher also suggests recommendations for future studies.  This chapter 
includes personal communication with the participants and experienced researchers to 
help with the interpretation of the results. 
Discussion 
Manipulation check.   A total of 22 participants (55 %) found the uninformed 
surprise condition for the single-engine aircraft surprising, while 28 participants (65 %) 
found it surprising for the multi-engine aircraft.  However, 20 participants (50 %) found 
the uninformed surprise and startle condition to be both surprising and startling for the 
single-engine and the multi-engine aircraft.  As discussed in Chapter 2, surprise and 
startle are often used interchangeably, and further, the term surprise is sometimes used 
interchangeably with startle.  For example, Rivera et al. (2014) in a review of the ASRS 
database found that the term startle is often not used to refer to startle but surprise.  
Findings from Rivera et al. (2014) are consistent with this study where in the uninformed 
surprise and startle condition, 8 participants (20 %) experienced surprise for the multi-
engine aircraft, while 10 participants (25 %) experienced surprise for the single-engine 
aircraft.  Surprise and startle are different constructs with different causes and effects.  
Hence it is very important to distinguish between surprise and startle, otherwise, it can 
lead to only partial understanding of the effects of surprise and startle on pilots during 
unexpected events.  If these effects are not distinguished and understood, it can 
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potentially void the benefits of any training scenarios developed based on partial 
understanding.   
Twenty-eight participants (70 %) found the informed condition neither surprising 
nor startling for the multi-engine aircraft, while 30 participants (75%) found the informed 
condition neither surprising nor startling for the single-engine aircraft.  For both aircraft, 
the results were evident to show that the manipulation had worked on most participants.  
However, a potential limitation of these results was that they are based on participant 
perception and cannot reflect on how others in the population would perceive these 
conditions. 
 Vital signs: Heart rate and respiration rate.  As expected and consistent with 
Bruna et al. (2018), respiration rate (RR) was higher for an uninformed emergency 
compared to an informed emergency.  Similarly, heart rate (HR) was also higher for the 
uninformed emergency compared to an informed emergency, however, the results were 
not consistent with Landman et al. (2017b), where no significant differences were found 
between an informed and uninformed surprise emergency.  The researcher would remind 
the readers that Bruna et al. (2018) and Landman et al. (2017b) had airline pilots as their 
sample; however, the current study had commercial pilots as its sample.  Further, the 
current study was the first to explore the effects of startle and surprise on commercial 
pilots, and the results can be potentially generalized to the population. The results 
categorized the uninformed emergency conditions as an uninformed surprise and 
uninformed startle and surprise; and found that the HR and RR are higher for the 
uninformed startle and surprise condition.  The loud bang and thunder noise were 
startling for most participants, especially participants flying the multi-engine aircraft 
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where the average HR was 86.06 beats per min compared to a HR of 81.91 for the single-
engine aircraft.   
The mean HR of pilots flying the multi-engine aircraft was higher than the single-
engine aircraft; see Table 4.  Most participants agreed that the multi-engine aircraft was 
harder to fly as they had to look at multiple instruments while flying ILS conditions.  An 
increased heart or respiration rate does not necessarily mean that the pilots were startled 
or surprised, which is why the researcher asked all participants their perception of the 
task.  However, the manipulation check showed that pilots’ subjective perceptions were 
generally consistent with the startle and surprise that the conditions were designed to 
induce for each aircraft.  One participant felt his “heart beating faster” when he heard the 
loud bang, while another participant had sudden body movements when he heard the 
thunder sound.  The sudden body movements when the sounds were played were 
consistent across most participants, something the researcher visually observed.  The 
results were also consistent with how the FAA and the EASA defined startle and surprise, 
where startle is something associated with higher heart rate and surprise being something 
different than the expectation. 
 NASA-TLX.  The multi-engine aircraft was mentally and physically demanding 
for most pilots.  The researcher, based on his interaction with participants, offers one 
possible explanation for this effect: since most commercial pilots fly the Cessna (single-
engine) aircraft regularly, they are more comfortable with flying a Cessna as they have 
more hours on that aircraft.  It is possibly due to this reason that the mental and physical 
workload for an informed emergency was significantly less for the single-engine aircraft.  
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The mental demand was not different between the aircraft for the surprise and startle 
condition.  The loud bang and thunder noise were meant to startle the pilots, and startle is 
associated with fear.  It is highly unlikely that the fear due to the startling event will be 
different if the pilot was flying a different aircraft.  
 The multi-engine aircraft was more physically demanding as the pilots had to 
initiate a go-around; also in the informed emergency condition, the physical demand 
scores were higher than in the uninformed surprise condition.  Initiating a go-around with 
engine failure is a physically demanding task, even if the condition is informed.  The 
temporal demand for the multi-engine aircraft was higher for the surprise emergency than 
the surprise and startle emergency, which was something not expected.  For the multi-
engine aircraft, 12 participants crashed the aircraft in the surprise condition, while 22 
participants crashed the aircraft in the surprise and startle condition.  Based on examining 
the data again, it was found that 11 participants that crashed the multi-engine aircraft in 
the surprise condition also crashed the aircraft again in the surprise and startle condition.  
These participants did not perceive the temporal demand to be high for the surprise and 
startle condition based on mere exposure as they were experiencing a similar outcome the 
second time around, so they had acclimated to the situation. 
Similarly, like mental demand, there was no difference in the temporal demand 
between the aircraft for the uninformed surprise and startle emergency.  It can be argued 
that the initial behavioral response to fear would not vary with respect to whether the 
pilot is flying a single- or multi-engine aircraft.  For example, if a person hears a gunshot 
which made him jump from his chair thinking what happened (mental demand) and run 
(temporal demand), it does not really matter if the person was at home or at work. 
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 Subjective performance (self-assessed), as measured using the NASA-TLX, had 
the highest score among the six subscales for both the aircraft.  On average, most 
participants rated their subjective performance as not up to their own standards except for 
the informed condition for the single-engine aircraft, which had the lowest score among 
all subscales for the informed condition.  One participant, after flying the surprise and 
startle condition for the multi-engine aircraft said, “I know how to feather and initiate 
missed approach, but the loud bang interrupted me.” As per another participant, “the 
thunder and lightning forced me to land quick and I was not looking at my altitude”, 
when asked why, the participant replied, “I guess I was sure that I will see the runway, 
but I never did.”  The author believes that most pilots were very critical of their 
performance; some even apologized and offered to re-fly the scenario.  Based on personal 
communication with the participants, the study found that most pilots that flew the single-
engine informed condition found it relatively straight forward, as it is an emergency that 
they have flown multiple times in a simulator.  More specifically, participants that flew 
this scenario as their last flight were happy that they ended the experiment on a good 
note; one participant said, “finally I was able to do what I wanted to do, and there was no 
disturbance.” 
Effort and frustration significantly varied across the aircraft and emergency 
conditions.  For frustration, the researcher had not expected significant interactions for 
frustration, which was corroborated by discussions with participants.  One participant 
suggested that “for me flying one aircraft over another is not frustrating as I need to build 
my hours.”  However, the researcher expected to find a significant interaction for effort, 
especially after a significant interaction was found for mental and physical demand.  
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There is no obvious explanation for this result, as some participants verbally suggested 
that the multi-engine aircraft took more effort than the single-engine aircraft.  It is one of 
those cases where the difference was just not statistically significant, though the mean 
effort for the multi-engine aircraft for all three emergency conditions was higher than the 
single-engine aircraft; see Table 7.  
Flight performance for single-engine aircraft (checklist steps followed).  Since 
the participants were not expecting an engine failure in the surprise condition, they may 
not have been mentally prepared for the checklist, which was evident from the higher 
mean number of checklist steps followed in the informed condition.  The surprise and 
startle condition further decreased the performance; 26 participants (65 %) in that 
condition forgot to enrich the mixture before restarting the engine, while 20 participants 
(50 %) failed to identify the landing field.  The performance measured using the checklist 
was consistent with the self-assessed performance for both the aircraft.  Engine failure 
training should incorporate startle and surprise as a factor.  The results do signify that 
having an informed engine-failure will result in high flight performance, but present 
training will not necessarily transfer to situations where the pilots are faced with the same 
emergency unexpectedly.   
Flight performance for multi-engine aircraft (altitude deviation).  Similar to 
the single-engine aircraft, altitude deviation performance was better in the informed 
condition, followed by the surprise condition, and the surprise and startle condition.  
More than half the participants (N = 22) crashed their aircraft in the surprise and startle 
condition; the engine-failure and the startle manipulation likely degraded conditions too 
much for the participants.  However, one participant who was not happy with his 
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performance said, “I was trying to find the runway and did not monitor my instruments 
for about 10 to 15 s”, in these 10 to 15 s the aircraft had an engine failure, and the altitude  
suddenly dropped, which led to the crash.  All this went unnoticed by the participant, who 
was busy trying to see the runway visually.   
Practical Implications 
 The effects of startle and surprise are well documented; however, this topic is  
under researched in the aviation industry.  A study done on commercial pilots found that 
simulator training can be helpful in mitigating the effects of startle (Gillen, 2016).  
Similarly, studies also found that vital signs (respiration rate) and skin conductance 
increase in surprise conditions (Bruna et al., 2018; Landman et al., 2017b).  Based on 
these studies, the research fraternity can agree that startle and surprise can affect 
performance and vital signs, and that training can possibly help mitigate the negative 
effects, which include inappropriate response during unexpected events not consistent 
with training.  However, the workload was not looked at by any of the previous studies.  
Similarly, which simulator scenarios would be used for training, and for what aircraft?  
This study tried answering those questions for commercial pilots, which represent 21.8 % 
of the total pilot population in the U.S.  It was found that flying a multi-engine aircraft 
during surprise and startle events can lead to higher workload, HR, and RR.  Similarly, 
flying a single-engine aircraft in the uninformed surprise and startle condition can lead to 
higher HR, RR, and workload. 
 The simulator scenarios proposed in this study can be potentially be used for 
startle and surprise training for commercial pilots.  The researcher believes that 
classroom training along with simulator training can help to mitigate the adverse effects 
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of unexpected events on pilot performance.  The key factor in the successful 
implementation of these simulator scenarios is that the pilots be uninformed about the 
emergency.  If pilots fly an informed emergency, their performance will be better (Bhana, 
2010).  The results of this study substantiated that claim, where pilots’ flight performance 
was better in informed emergency conditions and more than 70% of the participants were 
neither surprised nor startled while flying the informed emergency condition.  However, 
the flight performance deteriorated in the uninformed surprise condition and worsened in 
the uninformed surprise and startle condition.   
 A potential contribution of this study was that the results suggested that heart rate 
and respiration rate can be used as a physiological measurement for startle and surprise.  
Further studies can record and evaluate heart rate and respiration rate to ascertain if the 
simulator scenarios were startling or surprising as intended.  Also, based on the results, 
the researcher suggests that startle and surprise are not interchangeable terms in the 
aviation industry, and that the research fraternity considers this concept.  It is important to 
understand that contradicting research on this topic cannot help with paving the way for 
potential federal regulations.  
 This study identified that aircraft could be a factor during startle and surprise 
events.  Further, flying a surprise and startle emergency is more challenging than a 
surprise emergency.  Keeping the results of this study in mind, more simulator scenarios 
should be proposed, something the FAA also suggested in its AC (2017).   
Conclusions 
For commercial pilots, the type of aircraft they are flying can impact their 
performance, vital signs (HR and RR), and workload during surprising and startling 
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events.  It was evident from the results that HR and RR varied in response to emergency 
conditions in similar patterns and increased from uninformed surprise conditions to the 
uninformed surprise and startle condition.  The workload did increase significantly and 
was dependent on the aircraft and type of emergency.  It was mentally and physically 
harder to fly a multi-engine aircraft, as evidenced by higher levels of frustration and 
effort.  The key result of this study highlighted that having pilots fly informed emergency 
scenarios is not a good idea because it might make the training predictable; something 
with which Bhana (2010) agreed.  The results of this study found that flight performance 
was better when the pilots were flying informed emergency scenarios compared to when 
they were flying uninformed emergency scenarios.  The scenarios proposed in this study 
were surprising and startling for most pilots and can be used for training pilots, provided 
they are uninformed.  
Recommendations 
Vital signs.  This study, along with past studies, recorded and evaluated vital 
signs, which included HR, RR, and blood pressure.  Past studies also recorded skin 
conductance and heart rate variability.  Ideally, future studies should focus on the same 
measures for vital signs (HR, RR, blood pressure, and temperature) and try to validate the 
designs of previous studies with a different population.  However, the researcher highly 
suggests that future studies should focus on electroencephalography evaluating the alpha, 
beta, and gamma waves.  Electroencephalography is used in physiological research to 
evaluate the processing of complex stimuli (Biasiucci, Franceschiello, & Murray, 2019).  
The results of these futures studies can help identify the brain wave patterns during 
startling and surprising events on the flight deck, something no previous study has 
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evaluated.  Finally, electromyography is also a validated measure for startle (Blumenthal 
et al., 2005; Khemka, Tzovara, Gerster, Quednow, & Bach, 2017), but has not been used 
in any published aviation-related study so far.  
Workload using the NASA-TLX.  The current study was the first to assess pilot 
workload using NASA-TLX for unexpected events that can surprise and startle pilots.  
Future studies on this topic should use NASA-TLX to assess the pilot perception of the 
workload.  The researcher believes that most studies conducted on startle and surprise 
from an aviation perspective did not employ any mechanisms to gather pilot perception 
of the task.  Future studies can ask pilots their perception of the tasks as a manipulation 
check to establish if the scenario were surprising, startling, both or neither. 
Sample size.  Since few results were over-powered, the researcher recommends 
that future studies should conduct power analysis, preferably Beta testing, to estimate 
effect size for estimating sample size.  The results for the six NASA-TLX factors, heart 
rate, respiration rate were over-powered for the main effect of aircraft and emergency 
scenarios.  Similarly, the results for flight performance for both aircraft were also over-
powered.   
The results for all interactions had adequate power, so it is important to 
understand that if the goal is to evaluate the interaction between aircraft and emergency, 
then a sample of 40 is appropriate.  However, if future studies only want to evaluate 
aircraft or emergency, then a sample of 40 would result in over-powered results. 
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